Man-in-the-middle and traffic trust
V03 · reusable vector · version 1.0HIGH · proposed test impact
An adversary interposes on a communication path or abuses a trust mistake to observe or alter traffic. Not every packet observation is a successful MITM.
Attacker tools and payload types
A forged or altered response, misleading certificate or modified session data. The assessment uses synthetic traffic between owned lab endpoints.
The entries below are tools that can support assessment or emulate aspects of this vector in an authorised fixture. They are not claims that these exact products were used in every linked incident. Native platform availability and Armory installation are different from tested capability.
- Wireshark · Armory · Existing local tool notes · Maintained official user guide
- burpsuite · Armory · Existing local tool notes · Maintained official user guide
Repository and operating guides
network-flows.csv · RES-019 · published synthetic fixture in the assessment collection linked from the Repository.
JSON Web Token/README.md · existing Repository reference; choose only relevant approved checks.
Read the selected tool’s guide for installation and operation rather than recreating it here. Pin the deployed version and reviewed configuration in the task record. Some local guides are autogenerated inventory notes and contain stale commands or broad prerequisite lists; they require validation before use. The official manuals linked above were checked during this review.
Reusable controlled test
Use an explicitly configured isolated proxy/fixture to check certificate validation, transport protection and session handling. No production interception or unrelated traffic collection.
- Required permission
- Named endpoints, network, data classes and interception method; separate permission from normal network scanning.
- Parent supplies
- Scenario/risk ID; business question; exact targets; named permitted people; channel; current policy revision; tool/resource versions; limits; expected result and reviewer.
- Output
- One result per approved case, with run and target IDs, permission decision, evidence, actual outcome and coverage limits.
- Measure
- Invalid trust cases rejected / executed cases; valid secure sessions still succeed; any visible synthetic data documented. No client result has been collected here.
- Failure handling
- Blocked, not authorised, failed, inconclusive and not tested remain visible. A refused route cannot be replaced by another agent, channel or target without fresh applicable approval.
What the vector returns to the scenario
| Result | What it means |
|---|---|
| Control held | The evidenced attempted action was prevented under the tested conditions. This is not a universal security guarantee. |
| Control failed | Describe the exact observed boundary failure and its business consequence, without inflating it into a wider compromise. |
| Unknown / not tested | Record the missing capability, evidence, permission or coverage. Do not invent a score. |
Mitigation recommendations
Reduce likelihood: Enforce authenticated encryption and correct certificate/session handling.
Reduce impact: Limit session privilege, minimise sensitive traffic and detect suspicious trust changes.
Define how a later retest would verify the recommendation; implementation assignments, scheduling and pricing are Part 2.