Phishing, smishing and deceptive messages
V02 · reusable vector · version 1.0HIGH · proposed test impact
A deceptive email or SMS leads the recipient toward a harmful action or a false trust decision. This is a delivery technique that can be combined with V01.
Attacker tools and payload types
An email/SMS, link or attachment; a malicious version might harvest credentials or deliver code. The assessment uses an inert message and token-only landing page.
The entries below are tools that can support assessment or emulate aspects of this vector in an authorised fixture. They are not claims that these exact products were used in every linked incident. Native platform availability and Armory installation are different from tested capability.
- Agent001 · native service; handoff is not automatic execution
- VoiceOps · native service; handoff is not automatic execution
Setoolkit/Wifiphisher are candidate Armory mappings where shown, not the default execution route. Their capabilities may exceed the agreed simulation. Select and review a harmless lab profile; the inert fixture/manual method is sufficient for the initial assessment.
Repository and operating guides
simulation-script.txt · RES-008 · published synthetic fixture in the assessment collection linked from the Repository.
Account Takeover/README.md · existing Repository reference; choose only relevant approved checks.
Read the selected tool’s guide for installation and operation rather than recreating it here. Pin the deployed version and reviewed configuration in the task record. Some local guides are autogenerated inventory notes and contain stale commands or broad prerequisite lists; they require validation before use. The official manuals linked above were checked during this review.
Reusable controlled test
Use approved sender infrastructure, permitted recipients and a reviewed benign fixture. Record delivery, reporting and protective filtering without collecting passwords.
- Required permission
- Explicit email/SMS permission per person; sender/domain and approved content; no inherited permission from another channel.
- Parent supplies
- Scenario/risk ID; business question; exact targets; named permitted people; channel; current policy revision; tool/resource versions; limits; expected result and reviewer.
- Output
- One result per approved case, with run and target IDs, permission decision, evidence, actual outcome and coverage limits.
- Measure
- Delivered/attempted messages; reporting/confirmed delivery; protective-block counts and reasons. No client result has been collected here.
- Failure handling
- Blocked, not authorised, failed, inconclusive and not tested remain visible. A refused route cannot be replaced by another agent, channel or target without fresh applicable approval.
What the vector returns to the scenario
| Result | What it means |
|---|---|
| Control held | The evidenced attempted action was prevented under the tested conditions. This is not a universal security guarantee. |
| Control failed | Describe the exact observed boundary failure and its business consequence, without inflating it into a wider compromise. |
| Unknown / not tested | Record the missing capability, evidence, permission or coverage. Do not invent a score. |
Mitigation recommendations
Reduce likelihood: Improve filtering, sender authentication, verification and reporting processes.
Reduce impact: Strengthen MFA and sessions, reduce privilege and restrict subsequent data access.
Define how a later retest would verify the recommendation; implementation assignments, scheduling and pricing are Part 2.