{ "version": "1.0", "phase": 1, "execution_enabled": false, "production_changes": [ "Part 1 Library documentation", "Armory and Repository navigation links" ], "implementation_and_pricing": "deferred", "scenarios": [ { "id": "SC01", "slug": "refrigeration", "title": "When a cyberattack spoils the stock", "industry": "Food retail · cold storage · hospitality", "fact": "On 12–13 October 2026, CERT-FR reported compromises of Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC, Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb refrigeration controllers. Contemporary reporting describes French stores discarding spoiled refrigerated and frozen goods after the overnight attacks.", "sources": [ [ "CERT-FR · official alert, updated 13 October 2026", "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-012/" ], [ "Le Monde · reported impact, 13 October 2026", "https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2026/10/13/a-disastrous-day-for-french-supermarkets-after-massive-cyberattack-targets-refrigeration-systems_6758535_19.html" ] ], "limit": "The cited alert does not establish one initial-access mechanism, exploit or attacker for every affected store. Do not attribute a specific malicious tool or a final total loss to all victims.", "question": "Could someone change our refrigeration controls, and would we detect and contain it before stock is lost?", "systems": "Refrigeration controllers, remote-management interfaces, contractor accounts, VPN/router rules, store networks, temperature sensors and alarm delivery.", "people": "Refrigeration contractors, store managers, overnight responders and whoever owns remote-access configuration. A mistaken click is not required if a management interface is exposed.", "route": "Discover an exposed or supplier-accessible management path → gain unauthorised control through a weakness or compromised account → alter configuration → cooling is disrupted → independent monitoring and response determine the scale of loss.", "impact": "Spoiled inventory, closed aisles, interrupted trading and possible safety consequences. A restored controller cannot recover food already spoiled. Use the client’s actual stock value and temperature/time tolerances; do not invent a loss estimate.", "vectors": [ "v06", "v07", "v08" ], "methods": [ "network", "monitoring", "recovery" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Inventory and read-only access review", "Compare controller/firmware inventory and approved remote paths with network and vendor records. Do not probe production controls.", "Owned controllers with verified support/access status / in-scope controllers", "Inventory and exposure diagram" ], [ "MED", "Boundary and account checks in an isolated fixture", "Use a vendor-approved simulator or lab controller to test role and network boundaries, with permitted and denied controls.", "Prohibited management actions denied / executed lab cases", "Role/path result matrix" ], [ "MED", "Alarm and response tabletop", "Use synthetic temperature events and an agreed drill; verify the independent alarm route and response decision without changing food-storage temperatures.", "Events delivered/acknowledged; acknowledgement time; scenario response versus client-agreed spoilage window", "Event receipts and decision timeline" ] ], "likelihood": "Remove unnecessary Internet management exposure; use protected remote access, appropriate authentication, supported firmware and restricted contractor roles. Have the refrigeration owner review changes before any implementation.", "impact_reduction": "Independent temperature monitoring and alerts, local safe control, tested escalation and contingency stock-handling arrangements can limit damage if access controls fail.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/refrigeration.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC02", "slug": "customer-database", "title": "A convincing support request opens the customer database", "industry": "Professional services · recruitment · hospitality · membership businesses", "fact": "Caesars disclosed in September 2023 that social engineering against an outsourced IT support vendor preceded an unauthorised actor obtaining a copy of its loyalty-program database, including sensitive identity information for many members.", "sources": [ [ "Caesars · SEC disclosure", "https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1590895/000159089523000122/czr-20230930.htm" ] ], "limit": "The company disclosure supports the vendor-social-engineering and database-loss connection. It does not prove every phone script, tool or intermediate step proposed below.", "question": "Can an impostor turn contact with our staff or support provider into access to customer records?", "systems": "Public business information, email/SMS/telephone channels, helpdesk recovery, identity provider, CRM permissions, exports and audit logs.", "people": "Staff may receive the request; helpdesk staff may approve recovery; administrators define permissions. Their verification process and technical backstops matter as much as individual awareness.", "route": "Gather business context → impersonate a trusted contact → seek an identity or recovery change → use the resulting access → reach CRM records or exports → evade or outlast response.", "impact": "Customer information could be disclosed or misused, with trust, contracts and potential legal consequences affected. A message click does not prove account takeover, database export or total system loss.", "vectors": [ "v01", "v02", "v07", "v08" ], "methods": [ "client-database-social-engineering", "identity-password-mfa", "external-exposure" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Approved public context", "Use G02 on the client’s approved business sources, corroborating identities and excluding unrelated family data.", "Corroborated observations / reviewed observations", "Source and scope register" ], [ "HIGH", "Per-person contact simulation", "Use V01/V02 only for named permitted people and channels, with token-only measurement; denied people are excluded and recorded.", "Verification/reporting events / confirmed delivered approved simulations", "Channel receipts and behaviour measures" ], [ "MED", "Identity-to-data barrier checks", "Use test identities and synthetic CRM records to test MFA/recovery, roles and export controls. Mark assumed-compromise stages explicitly.", "Prohibited actions denied / executed cases; alert delivery and response times", "Separate identity, record-access, export and detection findings" ] ], "likelihood": "Strengthen support verification, phishing-resistant MFA and recovery; reduce unnecessary public detail and risky message paths.", "impact_reduction": "Restrict CRM permissions and exports, improve anomaly detection and practise rapid session revocation. Keep useful reporting easy for staff.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/customer-database.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC03", "slug": "payment-fraud", "title": "The invoice is plausible. The bank account is wrong.", "industry": "Construction · suppliers · finance teams · SMEs", "fact": "Ubiquiti reported that employee impersonation and fraudulent requests to its finance department led to $46.7 million in transfers in June 2015. Its later filing also records recoveries; the transfer amount is not the final net loss.", "sources": [ [ "Ubiquiti · March 2022 financial filing, describing the 2015 fraud", "https://ir.ui.com/sites/ubiquiti-ir/files/2022-05/ubnt-03-31-22-10q.pdf" ] ], "limit": "This is a documented finance-process fraud example. It does not establish that the victim’s mailbox was technically compromised or that the proposed tools below were used.", "question": "Would our payment process stop a convincing but unverified supplier or executive instruction?", "systems": "Mailboxes, supplier registers, invoice approval, payment authorisation and the independent callback channel.", "people": "Accounts-payable staff, executives, supplier relationship owners and approvers face time pressure and apparent authority.", "route": "Learn a believable transaction context → impersonate a supplier or executive → request a change or urgent transfer → exploit weak independent verification → payment reaches an unauthorised destination.", "impact": "Direct cash loss, delayed legitimate supplier payments, disputes and business interruption.", "vectors": [ "v01", "v02", "v07" ], "methods": [ "invoice-fraud", "governance" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Walk the approval process", "Trace a fictional invoice and bank-change request through normal decisions.", "Decision points with independent verification / required points", "Process map and control gaps" ], [ "HIGH", "Approved finance role-play", "Use a reviewed fictional request for permitted participants only; never provide a real payment destination or execute a transfer.", "Unverified changes stopped / executed approved scenarios", "Decision and verification evidence" ], [ "LOW", "Response tabletop", "Review the route for reporting, escalation and attempted payment recall using synthetic facts.", "Required decisions with reachable responsible role / required decisions", "Response gap report" ] ], "likelihood": "Verify changes through trusted contact information independent of the request, separate approval duties and protect finance identities.", "impact_reduction": "Use sensible payment controls and a rehearsed escalation/recall process. No recovery guarantee is implied.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/payment-fraud.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC04", "slug": "legacy-portal", "title": "An overlooked web page exposes customer records", "industry": "Telecoms · ecommerce · legal and client portals", "fact": "The ICO’s investigation of TalkTalk’s October 2015 breach identified SQL injection through legacy web pages and access to 156,959 customers’ personal data. It also identified outdated database software and earlier attacks missed through inadequate monitoring.", "sources": [ [ "ICO · TalkTalk investigation", "https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/media-centre/talktalk-cyber-attack-how-the-ico-investigation-unfolded/" ] ], "limit": "This supports legacy-asset, application and database risks. It does not mean every modern portal has the same flaw or that a scan result proves data loss.", "question": "Could a forgotten page, unsafe query or broken role check expose another customer’s information?", "systems": "Public/legacy applications, API routes, login sessions, database queries, service-account rights and logs.", "people": "Asset owners must know what is still online; developers and database administrators control trust boundaries. No employee interaction is necessary for an exposed application flaw.", "route": "Identify an exposed application → find an input or authorisation weakness → reach data beyond the intended role → retrieve or alter records if database permissions permit.", "impact": "Disclosure of personal or commercial information, fraud risk, service disruption and loss of confidence.", "vectors": [ "v06", "v07" ], "methods": [ "web-api", "database", "external-exposure" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Map owned exposure", "Reconcile the declared application inventory with approved passive evidence and owner confirmation.", "Owned routes reviewed / selected declared routes", "Asset and scope map" ], [ "MED", "Test synthetic role/query boundaries", "Use a staging fixture and paired allowed/denied cases. Select reviewed Repository checks rather than a whole payload collection.", "Correct access/query outcomes / executed applicable cases", "Reproducible evidence and clean controls" ], [ "MED", "Review downstream impact", "Verify the service role’s permissions and synthetic export behaviour; correlate application and database events.", "Sensitive actions appropriately restricted / tested actions", "Impact-limited findings and detection results" ] ], "likelihood": "Retire unused pages, keep software supported, use safe query construction and enforce server-side authorisation.", "impact_reduction": "Limit database service rights and exports, segment sensitive stores and retain meaningful monitoring.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/legacy-portal.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC05", "slug": "cloud-data", "title": "A cloud permission error becomes a data breach", "industry": "Financial services · SaaS · ecommerce", "fact": "The US Department of Justice’s Capital One case records an intrusion discovered in July 2019 and theft involving data from more than 100 million credit applications.", "sources": [ [ "US Department of Justice · Capital One case", "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/united-states-v-paige-thompson" ] ], "limit": "The example establishes the possible scale of cloud data loss. The following configuration/identity routes are hypotheses to test in a client environment, not a claim that every route occurred in this incident.", "question": "Could an exposed application, leaked build secret or excessive cloud role reach data it should not?", "systems": "Cloud identities, application endpoints, storage, CI/CD repositories, containers, secrets and audit trails.", "people": "Cloud engineers, developers and supplier administrators determine who can access which resource; review and ownership failures can create exposure without a staff-contact attack.", "route": "Find a public or application-mediated entry → gain an overprivileged identity or exposed resource → access sensitive storage → copy data or change a deployment.", "impact": "Large-scale disclosure, unauthorised deployment, tenant isolation failure and recovery burden.", "vectors": [ "v06", "v07", "v08" ], "methods": [ "cloud", "web-api", "governance" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Scope accounts and roles", "Agree exact tenants, repositories, read-only permissions and synthetic data.", "Selected resources with known owner/access rules / selected resources", "Cloud and role map" ], [ "MED", "Review configuration snapshots", "Use the selected read-only scanner and source/configuration checks, recording incomplete permissions as gaps.", "Selected applicable checks collected / selected applicable checks", "Configuration and secret-exposure findings" ], [ "MED", "Validate synthetic access", "Use test identities to confirm expected and prohibited storage or SaaS access, with audit events.", "Prohibited accesses denied / executed cases", "Role boundary and logging evidence" ] ], "likelihood": "Reduce public exposure and standing privilege, protect build secrets and review deployment configuration.", "impact_reduction": "Separate sensitive datasets and administration, restrict exports and detect unusual resource access.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/cloud-data.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC06", "slug": "guest-network", "title": "Guest connectivity becomes an internal-network route", "industry": "Retail · hotels · offices · shared premises", "fact": "In its 2008 TJX action, the FTC alleged inadequate wireless-access controls and insufficient limits between systems, alongside other security failures. The intrusion exposed payment-card data and other consumer information.", "sources": [ [ "FTC · TJX settlement announcement", "https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2008/03/agency-announces-settlement-separate-actions-against-retailer-tjx-data-brokers-reed-elsevier-seisint" ] ], "limit": "This is an older, well-documented boundary-failure example. Modern radio and authentication controls differ; it is not evidence that TJX used an evil portal or the tools in our proposed test.", "question": "Can a guest, nearby device or misleading WiFi login cross into business access or capture sensitive interaction?", "systems": "Guest/staff access points, SSIDs, network isolation, onboarding portals, endpoint certificate handling and internal services.", "people": "Visitors and staff choose networks; administrators define separation and onboarding. The test should evaluate protective controls, not merely whether a person recognises a network name.", "route": "Obtain nearby/guest connectivity or present a misleading network → exploit weak onboarding or trust → observe allowed traffic or reach internal services → pursue sensitive access where boundaries fail.", "impact": "Credential exposure, internal access, disrupted transactions and customer trust damage.", "vectors": [ "v03", "v04", "v07" ], "methods": [ "wireless", "network", "monitoring" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Confirm real wireless scope", "Inventory test devices, bands, locations, SSIDs and expected guest/business separation.", "Required coverage verified / approved required coverage", "Radio and network scope" ], [ "HIGH", "Isolated portal/trust simulation", "Use an owned lab SSID and test users only, if specifically authorised; use inert pages without password capture. No nearby guests or production access points are involved.", "Correct trust/onboarding decisions / approved executed cases", "Portal and endpoint observations" ], [ "MED", "Boundary and alarm checks", "Compare allowed and denied flows from the approved test device and verify a benign alert reaches a reviewer.", "Prohibited flows blocked; generated alerts received; acknowledgement time", "Flow evidence and response measures" ] ], "likelihood": "Strengthen wireless authentication, onboarding and certificate handling; keep guest and business access separate.", "impact_reduction": "Limit what any guest or low-trust device can reach, and monitor meaningful boundary violations.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/guest-network.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC07", "slug": "production-stoppage", "title": "The business stops when supporting IT stops", "industry": "Manufacturing · logistics · distribution", "fact": "JLR announced a phased manufacturing restart on 7 October 2025 following its early-September cyber incident, alongside a financing measure to support qualifying suppliers’ cashflow.", "sources": [ [ "JLR · manufacturing restart statement, 7 October 2025", "https://www.jlr.com/news/2025/10/jlr-restarts-manufacturing-and-introduces-new-financing-solution-pay-jlr-suppliers" ] ], "limit": "The company statement demonstrates operational and supplier impact. It does not identify an initial intrusion route; the proposed routes below are assessment hypotheses.", "question": "Which digital dependency could halt our operation, and can we contain an incident and restore essential work?", "systems": "Identity, production scheduling, warehouse/ERP systems, supplier connections, administration, backups and recovery dependencies.", "people": "IT responders and business owners must coordinate priorities; suppliers may carry access and recovery dependencies. Technical failure and response decisions can both interrupt operations.", "route": "Compromise an identity, exposed service or supplier route → expand reach through weak boundaries → disable or encrypt essential supporting systems → disrupt production and supplier operations.", "impact": "Lost output, missed deliveries, supplier cashflow pressure and prolonged recovery. Effects may spread beyond the directly attacked organisation.", "vectors": [ "v07", "v08", "v09" ], "methods": [ "network", "directory", "purple-team", "recovery" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Map the business dependencies", "Identify essential services, allowable downtime and the identity/vendor dependencies needed to recover them.", "Critical dependencies with verified owner and recovery input / selected dependencies", "Business dependency map" ], [ "MED", "Check containment in a lab", "Test approved identity and network boundaries using benign events and clean controls; do not deploy ransomware.", "Prohibited paths blocked; detection and containment decision times", "Boundary and detection report" ], [ "MED", "Measure isolated recovery", "Restore an agreed sample into isolation and validate representative business functions.", "Actual restore time; data age; business cases passed / executed cases", "Recovery evidence and assurance gaps" ] ], "likelihood": "Reduce exposed entry points and privileges, validate supplier access and improve containment boundaries.", "impact_reduction": "Protect and test backups, reduce critical single dependencies and rehearse business continuity decisions.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/production-stoppage.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC08", "slug": "critical-supplier", "title": "A supplier outage interrupts essential services", "industry": "Healthcare · outsourced operations · professional services", "fact": "After the 3 June 2024 Synnovis ransomware attack, NHS England reported that 1,294 outpatient appointments and 320 elective procedures were postponed at the two most affected trusts during 10–16 June.", "sources": [ [ "NHS England · dated clinical-impact report", "https://www.england.nhs.uk/london/2024/06/20/update-on-cyber-incident-clinical-impact-in-south-east-london-thursday-20-june/" ] ], "limit": "These are the figures for that stated week and those trusts, not lifetime incident totals. The cited report does not establish the original access method.", "question": "Can we maintain critical work when a trusted supplier’s systems or data exchange become unavailable?", "systems": "Supplier interfaces, shared identity, service queues, laboratory or equivalent processing, communications and alternative workflows.", "people": "Operational staff, supplier owners, incident commanders and service users need clear decisions and workable alternatives.", "route": "A supplier suffers compromise → essential data or processing becomes unavailable → dependent organisations accumulate delays → weak alternative processes increase impact.", "impact": "Delayed essential services, disrupted appointments or deliveries, backlogs and potential safety consequences depending on the sector.", "vectors": [ "v07", "v08", "v09" ], "methods": [ "governance", "recovery", "investigation", "monitoring" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Review supplier dependency", "Document data flow, service dependency, access and declared continuity arrangements without contacting systems outside scope.", "Critical supplier dependencies evidenced / selected dependencies", "Dependency and evidence map" ], [ "LOW", "Exercise an outage tabletop", "Use a synthetic outage to test communications, priority decisions and the approved alternative process.", "Critical decisions made with adequate information / required decisions; decision times", "Decision timeline and operating gaps" ], [ "MED", "Validate a safe alternative fixture", "Where approved, demonstrate sample-data processing or isolated restore through the alternative route.", "Representative business cases completed / selected cases", "Evidence of actual alternative capability" ] ], "likelihood": "Review supplier access, assurance evidence and shared control responsibilities; remove unnecessary trust.", "impact_reduction": "Maintain tested alternatives, prioritised continuity procedures and clear cross-organisation incident communication.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/critical-supplier.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC09", "slug": "mobile-spyware", "title": "A phone compromise exposes confidential work", "industry": "Executives · legal teams · civil society · sensitive roles", "fact": "Citizen Lab reported BLASTPASS on 7 September 2023 after finding an actively exploited zero-click iPhone chain delivering Pegasus spyware to a civil-society employee’s device. The researchers reported associated Apple fixes.", "sources": [ [ "Citizen Lab · original BLASTPASS investigation", "https://citizenlab.ca/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zero-click-zero-day-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/" ] ], "limit": "This is a documented exploitation case, but it does not imply that every unusual phone symptom is spyware or that a clean scan excludes compromise. This package does not reproduce the exploit.", "question": "Are sensitive mobile users adequately protected, and could we preserve and assess evidence if compromise were suspected?", "systems": "Mobile OS, messaging, device management, account sessions, backups and forensic evidence.", "people": "Sensitive roles face distinctive exposure; device owners, IT and investigators need an evidence-preserving reporting process. Zero-click compromise does not require a user mistake.", "route": "Target a vulnerable device or identity → gain access without or with user interaction → access communications/data → persist until detected or remediated.", "impact": "Loss of confidential communications and business intelligence, personal exposure and unreliable incident decisions if evidence is lost.", "vectors": [ "v05", "v07" ], "methods": [ "mobile", "investigation" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Review device and account posture", "Check approved inventory, support/update status, account protection and reporting arrangements.", "Required protections evidenced / applicable selected protections", "Posture and coverage report" ], [ "MED", "Validate sample evidence handling", "Acquire a consented supported sample, record hashes and timestamps, and analyse a working copy using validated tools.", "Evidence items with verified custody / acquired items; supported checks completed", "Forensic process results" ], [ "LOW", "Interpret and recommend", "Review indicator matches and alternatives with confidence statements and scope limits.", "Conclusions traceable to evidence / proposed conclusions", "Qualified findings and protection recommendations" ] ], "likelihood": "Keep platforms supported and updated, protect identities and select stronger device protections for roles whose threat profile warrants them.", "impact_reduction": "Minimise unnecessary sensitive data on devices, make incident reporting timely and preserve evidence for a proportionate response.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/mobile-spyware.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC10", "slug": "ai-data-leak", "title": "An AI assistant treats hostile content as an instruction", "industry": "Customer support · internal knowledge assistants · AI-enabled business tools", "fact": "EchoLeak research described CVE-2025-32711, a prompt-injection data-exfiltration weakness in Microsoft 365 Copilot involving crafted email. It is used here as a published research demonstration, not a claim of a confirmed customer breach.", "sources": [ [ "EchoLeak · published research paper", "https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI-SS/article/view/36899" ] ], "limit": "The example is about a particular researched weakness. It does not prove every assistant is vulnerable or establish current exposure in a patched product.", "question": "Can untrusted content make our assistant expose another customer’s data or request an unauthorised tool action?", "systems": "Retrieved documents/messages, model context, identity and data filters, connected tools, action approvals and output channels.", "people": "Owners choose data scope and tool permissions; staff may trust an assistant’s output. The weakness can be in the system boundary even when nobody clicks a suspicious link.", "route": "Place hostile instructions in lower-trust content → assistant processes it → model crosses a data or tool boundary → weak external authorisation permits disclosure or action.", "impact": "Confidential-data disclosure, incorrect business decisions or unauthorised changes through connected tools.", "vectors": [ "v10", "v07" ], "methods": [ "ai-agents", "cloud" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Map trust and action boundaries", "Identify data tenants, connected tools and decisions that must be enforced outside the model.", "Selected data/tool scopes with explicit authorisation rules / selected scopes", "Trust-boundary map" ], [ "MED", "Run synthetic hostile and benign cases", "Use the inert AI fixture and synthetic customer records in a sandbox with non-destructive tools.", "Unauthorised actions blocked / hostile cases; benign task success separately", "Input, response, tool-call and enforcement evidence" ], [ "MED", "Check interruption and policy changes", "Evaluate cancellation, changed approvals and budget stop/resume on synthetic jobs without real external effects.", "Cases with no duplicate or unauthorised effects / executed cases", "Boundary and lifecycle findings" ] ], "likelihood": "Separate trusted instructions from untrusted content and enforce data/tool authorisation independently of the model.", "impact_reduction": "Limit accessible data and tool effects, require appropriate human approvals and retain evidence of consequential actions.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/ai-data-leak.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" }, { "id": "SC11", "slug": "physical-information", "title": "A lost device or physical-access gap exposes useful information", "industry": "Offices · transport · facilities · shared workplaces", "fact": "An ICO announcement republished in October 2018 described a £120,000 fine after a Heathrow employee lost a USB memory stick in 2017, alongside shortcomings in data-protection practices.", "sources": [ [ "ICO announcement republished by WiredGov, 8 October 2018", "https://www.wired-gov.net/wg/news.nsf/print/Heathrow%2BAirport%2BLimited%2Bfined%2B120000%2Bfor%2Bserious%2Bfailings%2Bin%2Bits%2Bdata%2Bprotection%2Bpractices%2B09102018091000" ] ], "limit": "This is a loss-and-control-failure example, not evidence of a successful building intrusion. The physical-entry route below is a separate hypothetical client scenario.", "question": "Could someone obtain sensitive information or access through a lost device, visitor process or unattended workspace?", "systems": "Visitor/badge controls, workstations, portable storage, data encryption, disposal and physical incident logs.", "people": "Reception, facilities, contractors and staff handle access and portable information; clear verification and device controls reduce reliance on vigilance alone.", "route": "Obtain a lost device or exploit a permitted-access weakness → reach information or a workspace → use exposed material or an unlocked endpoint to widen access.", "impact": "Disclosure of sensitive business information, follow-on impersonation and possible unauthorised system access.", "vectors": [ "v01", "v05", "v07" ], "methods": [ "physical", "governance", "investigation" ], "tests": [ [ "LOW", "Review approved controls", "Inspect visitor/device policies and evidence of enforcement without attempting entry.", "Selected controls evidenced / applicable selected controls", "Control and scope report" ], [ "HIGH", "Specific physical exercise only if allowed", "Use named approved sites, methods, operator, escort and test badge. If building entry is prohibited, record it not authorised and use the separately approved review instead.", "Approved cases correctly challenged / executed cases", "Access decisions and limitations" ], [ "MED", "Benign removable-media fixture", "Use an inert canary and a client test endpoint to check device access, logging and data protection; no executable payload is required.", "Expected device/data protections enforced / executed cases", "Device-control evidence" ] ], "likelihood": "Improve visitor verification, temporary-access expiry, portable-data protection and secure working practices.", "impact_reduction": "Minimise sensitive data on portable devices, limit workstation privileges and make loss/access reporting prompt.", "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/scenarios/physical-information.html", "assessment_status": "NOT ASSESSED" } ], "step_routes": { "SC01": [ [ [ "v08" ], [ "manual:Refrigeration owner inventory and vendor configuration export" ], "cold-chain-review.csv", "Resolve unowned controllers, unsupported versions and undocumented remote-access paths before relying on them." ], [ [ "v06", "v07", "v08" ], [ "Network Map (nmap)", "Wireshark", "manual:Vendor-approved isolated controller or simulator" ], "role-matrix.csv", "Restrict the failed management path or role; validate vendor-supported hardening and support status. Never substitute a production controller for the lab." ], [ [ "v08" ], [ "manual:Independent temperature-alarm console and exercise controller" ], "detection-matrix.csv", "Improve independent sensing, alarm delivery or response decisions at the first failed stage; define a practicable response within the client’s stock-safety window." ] ], "SC02": [ [ [ "v01" ], [ "theHarvester (OSINT)", "Amass (Attack Surface Mapping)" ], "intel-register.csv", "Reduce unnecessary public business detail and resolve unverified assumptions before designing any permitted simulation." ], [ [ "v01", "v02" ], [ "app:agent001", "app:voiceops" ], "simulation-script.txt", "Improve the failed verification/reporting process and protective message controls; measure technical barriers separately." ], [ [ "v07", "v08" ], [ "burpsuite", "OWASP ZAP (Web App Scanner)", "app:crm" ], "synthetic-customers.csv", "Strengthen the particular recovery/MFA, role, export or alert barrier that failed; do not treat one employee interaction as proof of all failures." ] ], "SC03": [ [ [ "v01" ], [ "app:crm", "manual:Finance approval records" ], "invoice-scenario.txt", "Define independent verification and separation of duties for the actual payment/change decision." ], [ [ "v01", "v02" ], [ "app:agent001", "app:voiceops" ], "invoice-scenario.txt", "Improve trusted-channel callback and escalation when the request is urgent or unusual." ], [ [ "v07" ], [ "manual:Finance incident controller" ], "incident-injects.csv", "Clarify the reporting and recall route, decision authority and required evidence; do not imply funds will always be recovered." ] ], "SC04": [ [ [ "v06" ], [ "Amass (Attack Surface Mapping)", "theHarvester (OSINT)" ], "intel-register.csv", "Retire or secure forgotten owned application paths and establish an accountable asset inventory." ], [ [ "v06", "v07" ], [ "burpsuite", "OWASP ZAP (Web App Scanner)", "Sqlmap tool" ], "test-case.json", "Fix the evidenced query or authorisation defect and require a clean/allowed regression control." ], [ [ "v07" ], [ "manual:Database owner read-only permission review", "app:crm" ], "role-matrix.csv", "Reduce excessive service-account rights and export access; improve monitoring for the tested sensitive action." ] ], "SC05": [ [ [ "v07", "v08" ], [ "app:crm", "manual:Client cloud identity inventory" ], "role-matrix.csv", "Resolve unclear tenant ownership and remove unnecessary standing access." ], [ [ "v06", "v07" ], [ "Prowler (Cloud Security Scanner)", "ScoutSuite (Multi-Cloud Auditing)", "Trivy (Container/K8s Scanner)", "checkov", "Gitleaks (Git Secret Scanner)" ], "test-case.json", "Correct the material exposure or configuration flaw; rotate confirmed exposed secrets through the client process in a later authorised change." ], [ [ "v07" ], [ "manual:Client cloud/SaaS console with test identities" ], "synthetic-customers.csv", "Enforce the expected resource/tenant boundary and retain useful audit events." ] ], "SC06": [ [ [ "v03", "v04" ], [ "Wireshark", "manual:Wireless owner inventory" ], "wireless-matrix.csv", "Resolve missing bands/locations and define the actual guest/business boundary." ], [ [ "v04", "v03" ], [ "manual:Owned lab access point and inert portal", "Wireshark" ], "canary.txt", "Improve onboarding trust and certificate handling; do not collect real passwords or test unrelated nearby users." ], [ [ "v07", "v03" ], [ "Network Map (nmap)", "Wireshark" ], "network-flows.csv", "Restrict the failed guest/internal flow and repair the missing alarm or reviewer route." ] ], "SC07": [ [ [ "v08", "v09" ], [ "app:crm", "manual:Business continuity owner" ], "recovery-matrix.csv", "Document the missing service dependency and realistic recovery requirements." ], [ [ "v07", "v09" ], [ "BloodHound (AD Attack Paths)", "Network Map (nmap)", "Wireshark" ], "network-flows.csv", "Reduce the evidenced privilege or network path and improve detection of the approved benign event." ], [ [ "v09" ], [ "manual:Client backup/restore tooling in isolation" ], "recovery-matrix.csv", "Improve the failing backup, identity, application or business-validation dependency; establish evidence before claiming recovery readiness." ] ], "SC08": [ [ [ "v08" ], [ "app:crm", "manual:Supplier service and access records" ], "engagement-brief.json", "Clarify critical supplier responsibilities and remove unjustified shared access." ], [ [ "v09" ], [ "manual:Client/supplier exercise controller" ], "incident-injects.csv", "Improve alternative operating procedures and the decision/communication route that failed." ], [ [ "v09", "v08" ], [ "manual:Approved alternative service or isolated restore fixture" ], "synthetic-customers.csv", "Address the observed alternative-capacity or data-availability gap and define a later repeatable proof." ] ], "SC09": [ [ [ "v05", "v07" ], [ "manual:Device-management and identity consoles" ], "control-matrix.csv", "Recommend supported updates, appropriate account protection and a usable reporting route." ], [ [ "v05" ], [ "app:mvt", "Autopsy" ], "evidence-register.csv", "Correct custody, acquisition or supported-analysis gaps; label unsupported platforms and inconclusive results." ], [ [ "v05", "v07" ], [ "app:timesketch", "manual:Qualified case reviewer" ], "findings.csv", "Seek evidence that distinguishes alternative explanations and propose proportionate device/account protection." ] ], "SC10": [ [ [ "v10", "v07" ], [ "app:agentshield", "app:crm" ], "role-matrix.csv", "Define and enforce the missing external data/tool authorisation boundary." ], [ [ "v10" ], [ "app:decepticon", "app:pentestgpt" ], "ai-fixture.txt", "Reduce data/tool scope and prevent untrusted text from authorising a sensitive action." ], [ [ "v10", "v07" ], [ "app:hilly", "app:mission" ], "test-case.json", "Improve policy rechecks, cancellation and duplicate prevention before connecting real external effects." ] ], "SC11": [ [ [ "v01", "v05" ], [ "manual:Facilities and device-policy records" ], "physical-checklist.csv", "Clarify visitor/device ownership and evidence that controls operate." ], [ [ "v01", "v07" ], [ "manual:Facilities console and approved test badge" ], "physical-checklist.csv", "Improve the failed visitor-verification, escort or badge-lifecycle control; retain explicit physical exclusions." ], [ [ "v05" ], [ "manual:Client endpoint/device-control console" ], "canary.txt", "Improve the missing media restriction, portable-data protection or event logging without deploying an executable payload." ] ] }, "vectors": [ { "id": "V01", "version": "1.0", "title": "Social engineering and trusted-person impersonation", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Setoolkit" ], "native_routes": [ "app:agent001", "app:voiceops" ], "repository_documents": [ "Account Takeover/README.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-008", "permissions": "Staff contact, each named person, channel, time window and permitted request.", "measure": "Independent verification and reporting / confirmed delivered approved interactions; channel failures separately.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v01.html" }, { "id": "V02", "version": "1.0", "title": "Phishing, smishing and deceptive messages", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Setoolkit" ], "native_routes": [ "app:agent001", "app:voiceops" ], "repository_documents": [ "Account Takeover/README.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-008", "permissions": "Explicit email/SMS permission per person; sender/domain and approved content; no inherited permission from another channel.", "measure": "Delivered/attempted messages; reporting/confirmed delivery; protective-block counts and reasons.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v02.html" }, { "id": "V03", "version": "1.0", "title": "Man-in-the-middle and traffic trust", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Wireshark", "burpsuite" ], "native_routes": [ "Wireshark", "burpsuite" ], "repository_documents": [ "JSON Web Token/README.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-019", "permissions": "Named endpoints, network, data classes and interception method; separate permission from normal network scanning.", "measure": "Invalid trust cases rejected / executed cases; valid secure sessions still succeed; any visible synthetic data documented.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v03.html" }, { "id": "V04", "version": "1.0", "title": "Evil portal and misleading wireless onboarding", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Wireshark", "Wifiphisher" ], "native_routes": [ "Wireshark", "manual:Owned lab access point and inert portal" ], "repository_documents": [], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-022", "permissions": "Specific SSID/location, radio environment, test devices, people and channel. Physical location access and wireless manipulation require separate approvals.", "measure": "Correct trust decisions / executed approved cases; prohibited network flows blocked; reporting events.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v04.html" }, { "id": "V05", "version": "1.0", "title": "Malicious files, removable media and device content", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Autopsy" ], "native_routes": [ "Autopsy", "app:mvt", "manual:Client endpoint/device-control console" ], "repository_documents": [], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-022", "permissions": "Named test endpoint/device, file class, acquisition authority and data scope; no automatic approval to execute attachments.", "measure": "Correct device/file-control outcomes / executed cases; evidence integrity; supported analysis coverage.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v05.html" }, { "id": "V06", "version": "1.0", "title": "Exposed services and application-input abuse", "proposed_test_impact": "MED", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "burpsuite", "OWASP ZAP (Web App Scanner)", "Sqlmap tool" ], "native_routes": [ "burpsuite", "OWASP ZAP (Web App Scanner)", "Sqlmap tool" ], "repository_documents": [ "SQL Injection/SQLmap.md", "Insecure Direct Object References/README.md", "Business Logic Errors/README.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-006", "permissions": "Exact app/routes, methods, target environment, request limits and data access; industrial equipment requires a separate vendor-approved method.", "measure": "Applicable tests executed; confirmed/refuted hypotheses; prohibited accesses denied and evidence limits.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v06.html" }, { "id": "V07", "version": "1.0", "title": "Credential, session, recovery and privilege abuse", "proposed_test_impact": "MED", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "burpsuite", "BloodHound (AD Attack Paths)" ], "native_routes": [ "burpsuite", "BloodHound (AD Attack Paths)" ], "repository_documents": [ "Account Takeover/mfa-bypass.md", "Methodology and Resources/Active Directory Attack.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-012", "permissions": "Named identities and actions, explicit recovery permission, attempt limits and data scope; contacting helpdesk requires V01 permission too.", "measure": "Correct access/recovery decisions / executed cases; revocation behaviour; coverage by identity class.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v07.html" }, { "id": "V08", "version": "1.0", "title": "Supplier access and remote-administration abuse", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Network Map (nmap)" ], "native_routes": [ "app:mission", "Network Map (nmap)", "manual:Client remote-access console" ], "repository_documents": [ "Methodology and Resources/Network Discovery.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-013", "permissions": "Exact supplier identity, target, administrative action, tool/session and window. One client cannot approve testing another organisation’s systems.", "measure": "Prohibited remote actions denied / executed cases; remote-session visibility and revocation time.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v08.html" }, { "id": "V09", "version": "1.0", "title": "Lateral movement, data theft and ransomware impact", "proposed_test_impact": "HIGH", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [ "Wireshark", "Network Map (nmap)" ], "native_routes": [ "app:sliver", "Wireshark", "app:timesketch" ], "repository_documents": [ "Methodology and Resources/Windows - Defenses.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-018", "permissions": "Specific lab hosts, event types, controller/operator and cleanup; production execution requires a separate reviewed method.", "measure": "Paths blocked; events collected/detected/acknowledged; measured recovery time/data age and business-validation results.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v09.html" }, { "id": "V10", "version": "1.0", "title": "Prompt injection and AI trust-boundary abuse", "proposed_test_impact": "MED", "classification_approved": false, "armory_tools": [], "native_routes": [ "app:agentshield", "app:decepticon", "app:pentestgpt" ], "repository_documents": [ "Prompt Injection/README.md" ], "fixture_resource_id": "RES-023", "permissions": "Exact assistant, dataset, model budget, test tools and permitted actions; retrieved text never grants authority.", "measure": "Unauthorised actions blocked / hostile cases; useful benign task completion; policy-change and interruption outcomes.", "execution_enabled": false, "url": "https://tenguprotect.com/pentest/library/vectors/v10.html" } ], "resources": [ { "id": "RES-001", "path": "resources/approval-policy.json", "sha256": "96d72730740197fd7ee90342cd4ec4147a9d22f5fdddbe076c81dd3b812d4982", "synthetic_or_template": true, "url": 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